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3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

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6 RAY GRAHAM,

7 Plaintiff,

8 v.

9 FLOWERS BAKING COMPANY OF  
HENDERSON, LLC,

10 Defendant.  
11

Case No. 2:20-cv-00153-JAD-DJA

12 **ORDER**

13 This matter is before the Court on the parties' Consent Confidentiality Agreement and  
14 Stipulated Protective Order (ECF No. 30), filed on May 19, 2020. The parties request that the  
15 Court enter a protective order to govern their exchange of confidential information. However, the  
16 parties fail to state the governing standard for filing documents under seal with the Court. This  
17 order reminds counsel that there is a presumption of public access to judicial files and records. A  
18 party seeking to file a confidential document under seal must file a motion to seal and must  
19 comply with the Ninth Circuit's directives in *Kamakana v. City and County of Honolulu*, 447  
20 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2006) and *Center for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Group, LLC*, 809 F.3d 1092,  
1097 (9th Cir. 2016).

21 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the parties' Consent Confidentiality Agreement and  
22 Stipulated Protective Order (ECF No. 30) is **granted subject to the following modifications:**

- 23 • The Court has adopted electronic filing procedures. Attorneys must file  
24 documents under seal using the Court's electronic filing procedures. *See* Local  
25 Rule IA 10-5. Papers filed with the Court under seal must be accompanied with a  
26 concurrently-filed motion for leave to file those documents under seal. *See* Local  
27 Rule IA 10-5(a).  
28

- 1           • The Court has approved the instant protective order to facilitate discovery  
2           exchanges, but there has been no showing, and the Court has not found, that any  
3           specific documents are secret or confidential. The parties have not provided  
4           specific facts supported by declarations or concrete examples to establish that a  
5           protective order is required to protect any specific trade secret or other confidential  
6           information pursuant to Rule 26(c) or that disclosure would cause an identifiable  
7           and significant harm.
- 8           • All motions to seal shall address the standard articulated in *Ctr. for Auto Safety*  
9           and explain why that standard has been met. 809 F.3d at 1097.
- 10          • Specifically, a party seeking to seal judicial records bears the burden of meeting  
11          the “compelling reasons” standard, as previously articulated in *Kamakana*. 447  
12          F.3d 1172. Under the compelling reasons standard, “a court may seal records only  
13          when it finds ‘a compelling reason and articulate[s] the factual basis for its ruling,  
14          without relying on hypothesis or conjecture.’” *Ctr. for Auto Safety*, 809 F.3d at  
15          1097. (quoting *Kamakana*, 447 F.3d at 1179). “The court must then  
16          ‘conscientiously balance[ ] the competing interests of the public and the party who  
17          seeks to keep certain judicial records secret.’” *Ctr. for Auto Safety*, 809 F.3d at  
18          1097.
- 19          • There is an exception to the compelling reasons standard where a party may satisfy  
20          the less exacting “good cause” standard for sealed materials attached to a  
21          discovery motion unrelated to the merits of the case. *Id.* “The good cause  
22          language comes from Rule 26(c)(1), which governs the issuance of protective  
23          orders in the discovery process: ‘The court may, for good cause, issue an order to  
24          protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue  
25          burden or expense.’” *Id.* (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c)). “For good cause to exist, the  
26          party seeking protection bears the burden of showing specific prejudice or harm  
27          will result if no protective order is granted.” *Phillips v. General Motors*, 307 F.3d  
28          1206, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 2002).

- The labels of “dispositive” and “nondispositive” will not be the determinative factor for deciding which test to apply because the focal consideration is “whether the motion is more than tangentially related to the merits of a case.” *Ctr. for Auto Safety*, 809 F.3d at 1101.
- The fact that the Court has entered the instant stipulated protective order and that a party has designated a document as confidential pursuant to that protective order does not, standing alone, establish sufficient grounds to seal a filed document. *See Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.*, 331 F.3d 1122, 1133 (9th Cir. 2003); *see also Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Co.*, 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1992). If the sole ground for a motion to seal is that the opposing party (or non-party) has designated a document as confidential, the designator shall file (within seven days of the filing of the motion to seal) either (1) a declaration establishing sufficient justification for sealing each document at issue or (2) a notice of withdrawal of the designation(s) and consent to unsealing. If neither filing is made, the Court may order the document(s) unsealed without further notice.
- To the extent any aspect of the stipulated protective order may conflict with this order or Local Rule IA 10-5, that aspect of the stipulated protective order is hereby superseded with this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 21, 2020.

  
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DANIEL J. ALBRECHTS  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE